Reed F. Noss's "Wilderness Recovery: Thinking Big in Restoration Ecology" was originally published in *The Environmental Professional* 13 (1991): 225–34.

Dave Foreman's "Wilderness: From Scenery to Nature" was originally published in *Wild Earth* 5(4) (Winter 1995/96): 9–16.

J. Baird Callicott's "Should Wilderness Areas Become Biodiversity Reserves?" was first published in *The George Wright Forum* 13(2) (1996): 32–38.

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Gary Paul Nabhan's "Cultural Parallax in Viewing North American Habitats" was originally published in *Reinventing Nature? Responses to Postmodern Deconstruction,* edited by Michael E. Soulé and Gary Lease (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1995), pp. 87–101.

Gary Snyder's "The Rediscovery of Turtle Island" was originally published in *A Place in Space: Ethics, Aesthetics, and Watersheds* (Washington, D.C.: Counterpoint, 1995), pp. 236–51. Reprinted with permission.

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"Introduction," co-authored with J. Baird Callicott, to *The Great New Wilderness Debate*, Callicott and Nelson, eds., (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press), pp. 1-20,

J. Baird Callicott and Michael P. Nelson

Introduction

ITS TITLE MAY SUGGEST to some that this volume exposes and systematizes the diatribes against wilderness preservation forthcoming from talk radio demagogues such as Rush Limbaugh, and documents the defenses against such assaults mounted by beleaguered environmentalists. But that is *not* what this book is about. Well-heeled special interests—off-road recreational vehicle manufacturers, corporate cattle ranchers, mining companies, oil companies, and timber companies—have funded a new and reactionary so-called Wise Use Movement, dedicated to the undoing of local, state, and especially federal environmental legislation and regulation. The name itself is a dissembling perversion of the credo of Gifford Pinchot, the high-minded, well-intentioned chief architect of the Progressive conservation movement—which was born a century ago and which began the tradition of public commitment to environmental protection in North America. Typically, these special interests (some of them foreign-owned) —who stand to profit from the opening of wilderness areas to motorized recreation, grazing, mining, drilling, and clear-cutting—wrap their greed in the flag of individual freedom and private property rights. Their wealthy propagandists cynically claim to represent the ordinary, middle-class American in his or her mythic, Manichaean struggle against big gov-

ernment and cryptic socialism. Ron Arnold, Rush Limbaugh, and other irresponsible critics of wilderness preservation have nothing of intellectual interest to say, though the damage that their vituperative disinformation campaigns can do to the cause of conservation is real enough. Talk-radio-type wilderness bashing will, therefore, not be represented in this book; it will not be included alongside sincere and honest critical discussion of the wilderness idea nor be dignified as worthy of serious consideration. (In Part IV of this collection of essays, Gary Snyder more fully discusses the Wise Use Movement and its nefarious agenda.)

What then is this book about? It is about a *concept,* the "received wilderness idea"—that is, the notion of wilderness that we have inherited from our forebears. And it is an anthology; it includes, with a few notable exceptions, previously published work by many authors, who approach the concept of wilderness from many different points of departure, and who write in a wide variety of styles, addressed to a wide variety of primary audiences. The theme that binds these otherwise disparate writings into a coherent whole is the concept of wilderness. Some of the authors contributing to this anthology are academics, and some are not; those academics who formally cite sources do so in various ways—the ways typical of their several disciplines—and in many specific styles. Except for a few excerpts from longer works, most of the items in this anthology are complete, freestanding essays. The received wilderness idea is currently the subject of intense attack and impassioned defense on several fronts at once. The wilderness idea is alleged to be ethnocentric, androcentric, phallocentric, unscientific, unphilosophic, impolitic, outmoded, even genocidal. Defenders of the wilderness idea insist that it is none of these things. The received wilderness idea, has, in short, recently been the subject of heated debate. In sum, then, this anthology documents the current debate about the received wilderness idea. Before we go on to introduce this great new wilderness debate, however, we should first contextualize it.

Just who are "we" who have inherited the wilderness idea? And who are "our" forebears? Most immediately, *we,* the editors of this anthology, are Euro-American men, and our own cultural legacy is patriarchal Western civilization in its current postcolonial, globally hegemonic form. Though often resented and sometimes resisted, Americanized Western civilization (*civilization* here not in its congratulatory, but in its descriptive sense, ultimately from the Latin *civitas,* city) has—for better or worse, like it or not

—come to dominate the planet. Therefore, to one degree or another, the "we" in the first sentence of the previous paragraph also, most generally, comprises everyone on Earth and our (the editors') cultural legacy is also everyone's cultural legacy. However, we (the editors) are also academic philosophers; and from its Socratic beginnings, Western philosophy has involved, among other things, self-examination. Though our cultural legacy may be postcolonial, patriarchal, hegemonic Western civilization, we (the editors) believe that we can be, if not objective, then at least critically self-aware and, accordingly, sincerely strive not to privilege the discourse of the ethnic and gender groups to which, as an accident of birth, we happen to belong.

In the "conversation of the West," the voices giving shape to the concept of wilderness, those from whom we have received the wilderness idea, are mostly the colonial and postcolonial male writers represented in Part I of this anthology—Jonathan Edwards, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Henry David Thoreau, John Muir, Theodore Roosevelt, Aldo Leopold, Robert Marshall, and Sigurd Olson. With the possible exception of Robert Marshall, who, like Aldo Leopold, was a well-born wilderness-minded employee of the United States Forest Service, and Sigurd Olson, a northwoods nature writer, these men are all well-known figures in American letters and need no introduction by us. The work of these writers is included in this anthology, not because, like us, they are male and Euro-American, nor because they are the only historical writers on the subject of wilderness, nor because they had the most profound, sophisticated, or even interesting things to say about wilderness, but because their writings on wilderness, fairly sampled here, most influenced the popular wilderness idea. They articulated the concept of wilderness that is variously criticized (often as being both androcentric and ethnocentric) and defended in Parts II and III of this book.

Also included in Part I are a 1963 document, conventionally known as "The Leopold Report," that has exerted considerable influence on public wilderness policy in the United States, and the oft-quoted text of the legislation enacted by the Congress of the United States, conventionally known as "The Wilderness Act of 1964" (ghost-written by the pro-wilderness Washington lobbyist Howard Zahnizer), that established a national system of wilderness preserves. In Zahnizer's now standard definition of *wilderness* in the Wilderness Act—"a wilderness, in contrast with those areas

where man and his own works dominate the landscape, is hereby recognized as an area where the earth and its community of life are untrammeled by man, where man is a visitor who does not remain"—the received wilderness idea is crystallized. Concluding Part I are two essays published here for the first time. The first is a conceptual analysis of the Wilderness Act by environmental philosopher Mark Woods. The second, by environmental philosopher Michael Nelson (one of the editors of this anthology), is a collection, summary, and evaluation of the many and various arguments for wilderness preservation advanced by those who have taken the concept of wilderness at face value, who have innocently believed that the word *wilderness,* like the word *mountain,* was the innocuous and unproblematic English name for something that exists in the world independently of any socially constructed skein of ideas.

Logically enough, that's how Part I ends, but why does it begin with an excerpt from the writings of Jonathan Edwards, a Puritan preacher? Edwards certainly has a widely acknowledged preeminent place in Euro-American intellectual history, but his name does not spring to mind—as do the names of Thoreau, Muir, Leopold, and Marshall—in connection with the wilderness idea. As environmental historian Roderick Nash demonstrates, in his now classic 1967 study of the wilderness idea, *Wilderness and the American Mind,* the "wilderness condition" of North America was certainly a preoccupation of the Puritans. For the first generation of Puritan colonists, it was, understandably, a wholly negative condition, something to be feared, loathed, and ultimately eradicated—something to be replaced by fair farms and shining cities on hills. The very success of their immigrant forebears in transforming the New England landscape into something resembling the landscape of the mother country, however, bequeathed prosperity to subsequent generations of Puritans. A cornerstone of Puritan Presbyterianism is the doctrine of original sin, which seemed to Edwards to express itself, in his own time, less in the reduced and pacified Native American population and the thoroughly domesticated countryside, and more in the prosperous populace of New England towns and cities. By contrast, the wild remnants of pre-settlement America that could be found here and there in Connecticut and Massachusetts appeared innocent and pure; to Edwards they seemed even to portend the divine.

We (the editors) are convinced that the originally colonial and eventually postcolonial received concept of wilderness is first and foremost an artifact

of the sharp dichotomy, in Puritan thinking, between humanity, on the one hand—exclusively created in the image of God, but also fallen and depraved—and nature, on the other. The first generation of Puritans thought of themselves primarily as God's emissaries in the New World—which, to their perfervid, religion-besotted imaginations, was the wild, unruly stronghold of Satan. In the no less vivid imagination of Jonathan Edwards, the true stronghold of Satan had become the sinful human heart in the breast of his Euro-American neighbors, and the pristine American landscape had become Edenic. Interestingly, many of the most notable and most passionate subsequent defenders of the wilderness faith have a direct connection to Calvinism. Two stand out especially. Muir, famously, was brought up in a strict and austere Presbyterian household; and environmental philosopher Holmes Rolston III, among the most stalwart contemporary defenders of the wilderness idea, is an ordained Presbyterian minister.

The first criticism of the wilderness idea was voiced by those upon whom it was imposed and those whom it dispossessed. As documented by "Indian Wisdom," from *Land of the Spotted Eagle* by Chief Luther Standing Bear (like the famous Black Elk, an Oglala Lakota), published in 1933 and reprinted here, the wilderness idea was directly challenged by Native Americans, who were its first victims. But until very recently, the voices of Native Americans on this matter—as on almost all others—were muffled and ignored. In the third edition of *Wilderness and the American Mind,* published in 1982, Nash duly though belatedly noted Standing Bear's protest against the wilderness idea, but did not accordingly revise his sympathetic, even celebratory account of how the concept of wilderness gradually shed its largely negative connotations in mainstream Euro-American culture, and acquired positive connotations.

Since World War II, American economic, political, and cultural influence has spread inexorably. Along with many other things American, the wilderness idea and the public policies it inspired were adopted by empowered elements in postcolonial nation-states throughout the world, but especially in Africa and India. To set up Part II of this anthology, we have included an excerpt from Nash's chapter, "The International Perspective," newly written for the third edition of *Wilderness and the American Mind,* in which he details, without much critical reflection or comment, the emer-

gence of an international trade in the wilderness experience. In that discussion, Nash focuses mainly on African national parks. We (the editors) were unable to find any essay by a native African spokesperson that specifically discusses the wilderness idea. However, a sympathetic Euro-American writer, David Harmon, tried to indicate the impact of the wilderness idea when it was exported to Africa in "Cultural Diversity, Human Subsistence, and the National Park Ideal," originally published in the journal *Environmental Ethics* in 1987. In *The Mountain People,* British anthropologist Colin Turnbull painted a morbidly fascinating portrait of the infamous Ik, a tribe of people who seemed inhumanly indifferent to one another. Harmon reveals that these unfortunate people had once been isolated gatherer-hunters, happily, successfully, sustainably, and humanly living by traditional means in the Kidepo highlands of Uganda. They seem literally to have abandoned their humanity, in their abject despair over having been evicted from their homeland and forced to live in sedentary villages, so that when in Kidepo did President Milton "Apollo" Abote a stately national park decree, it might measure up to the American ideal of a wilderness park, a place "where man is a visitor who does not remain."

Harmon's critique of the wilderness idea from a mostly fourth-world perspective—that is, from the perspective not of the "progressive" elite in developing countries, but of disempowered traditional tribal groups whose way of life is threatened by "progress" and "development" in the third world—went mostly unnoticed and unanswered. In 1989, "Radical American Environmentalism and Wilderness Preservation: A Third World Critique," by Ramachandra Guha, an Indian sociologist, appeared in *Environmental Ethics.* Perhaps because the words *wilderness, critique,* and *third world* were right in its title, and Guha's name was recognizably non-Western, his article attracted the attention of the community of Western environmental philosophers, most of whom innocently thought of wilderness as nature's sanctum sanctorum. Two proponents of the wilderness idea—the distinguished Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess, founder of the Deep Ecology school of thought, and political scientist David Johns, a wilderness activist—replied in subsequent issues of the same journal. Thus did the great new wilderness debate commence. This anthology brings together in one volume the most notable contributions to this debate. Because a debate is by nature dialectical—proceeding by point and counterpoint, thesis and antithesis—immediately following Guha's third-world critique of the wilderness idea we have included the rejoinder by Johns, "The Relevance of Deep Ecology to the Third World." Following that we have placed "Deep Ecology Revisited," Guha's response to Johns and other apologists for Deep Ecology's embrace of the received wilderness idea. Coming last in this Third World–Deep Ecology exchange, Arne Naess's "The Third World, Wilderness, and Deep Ecology" strives to integrate—in the concept of "free nature"—Guha's evident concern for peoples subsisting by traditional means with the concern of Deep Ecologists for nonhuman species.

Also representing third- and fourth-world perspectives on the wilderness idea are the renowned Mexican ethnobotanist Arturo Gómez-Pompa and his collaborator Andrea Kaus, a Euro-American anthropologist. Their aggressively titled scientific critique of the wilderness idea, "Taming the Wilderness Myth" (originally published in *BioScience*), is written from a Latin American point of view. In addition, we (the editors) feel very fortunate indeed to have found and to be able to reprint Fabienne Bayet's article "Overturning the Doctrine: Indigenous People and Wilderness—Being Aboriginal in the Environmental Movement." Bayet, as she explains in her essay, is an Australian Aboriginal woman of color *and* a committed environmentalist, for whom criticizing the wilderness idea is—as it is for us the editors of this anthology, who are also committed environmentalists—a painful thing to have to do. Her poignant piece records her struggle to reconcile conflicting loyalties.

Bayet's essay exposes a more sinister aspect of the received wilderness idea. The European conquest and settlement of Australia occurred more recently and in a less desultory way than did the European conquest and settlement of the Americas. To think of Australia before European settlement as a wilderness of continental proportions—as a *terra nullius* (an empty land) in the jargon of Anglo-Australian jurisprudence—made the dispossession and extermination of its Aboriginal human inhabitants morally more palatable. The wilderness idea, in effect, erased those inhabitants from Western consciousness—and thus from conscience. While the wilderness idea served colonial Anglo-Australians by concealing from themselves and from the rest of the Western world their systematic policy of genocide, it now serves contemporary postcolonial Australian environmentalists, no less than it does postcolonial American environmentalists, as a means of checking industrial environmental rapine. This then is Bayet's

dilemma. The wilderness idea is unhistorical. Australia was not a wilderness, a *terra nullius,* before British conquest and settlement. It was, as Bayet notes, fully settled and actively managed by its Aboriginal inhabitants. But designated wilderness areas are now a vital element in Australian nature conservation, just as they are in the United States. To deconstruct the wilderness idea therefore risks undermining nature conservation. Part II ends with an essay, "The Wilderness Narrative and the Cultural Logic of Capitalism," by British environmental philosopher Carl Talbot, written from a Marxist point of view and published here for the first time. Talbot provides the critical antidote to Nash's enthusiastic endorsement of an international trade in the wilderness experience, thus bringing Part II full circle.

Environmental philosopher J. Baird Callicott (one of the editors of this anthology) was as surprised and troubled as any other Western environmental philosopher by Guha's third-world critique of the received wilderness idea. His response was different, however, from that of Johns and Naess. Rather than chiming in with other apologists, Callicott attempted to widen and deepen Guha's critique of the concept of wilderness. In "The Wilderness Idea Revisited: The Sustainable Development Alternative," he points out that in addition to the untoward social consequences of exporting the wilderness idea to (in Guha's words) "long-settled, densely populated" regions of the world, the received wilderness idea might actually be conceptually incoherent. First, and most generally, it perpetuates the pre-Darwinian separation of "man" from nature, while from an evolutionary point of view, Homo sapiens is a part of nature. Second, in serving its colonial purpose of erasing from mind indigenous peoples, whose existence, if acknowledged and honestly confronted, might morally impede the march of empire, it also blinds those it enthralls to the considerable impact of such peoples on the biotic communities that they inhabit(ed). Only Antarctica would qualify as a wilderness area of continental proportion, according to the definition of the Wilderness Act. Most of North and South America and Australia certainly would not, as these areas were thoroughly inhabited by indigenous peoples—Australia for more than 40,000 years, the Americas for more than 11,000—who were, of course, not visitors in their own homelands. Moreover, the works of these peoples did (and often still do) dominate the landscape ecologically, though not in the same way, or as evidently to the untutored eye, as do the works of industrial Homo sapiens.

Callicott's paper was originally published in a journal called *The Environmental Professional* and was followed in the next issue of the same volume (1991) by environmental philosopher Holmes Rolston III's rejoinder, "The Wilderness Idea Reaffirmed," and by a brief response to Rolston by Callicott. Rolston reaffirms the separation of Homo sapiens from nature, but not on such fanciful traditional grounds as the biblical doctrine that "man" is unique because "he" is created in the image of God or the classical philosophical doctrine that "man" is unique because "he" is uniquely rational. Rather, Rolston argues, Homo sapiens uniquely possesses culture, a means of adapting to the environment (and adapting the environment to the species) so disproportionate to that of other species that Homo sapiens has literally transcended nature. However, pre-Columbian Native Americans and Australian Aboriginals before the advent of James Cook, while fully cultural Homo sapiens, had such ineffectual, largely Stone Age cultures, Rolston believes, that they little impacted their environments—which remained, therefore, largely "untrammeled," as per the definition of *wilderness* in the Wilderness Act, not "areas where man and his own works dominate the landscape." Wilderness preservation, Rolston therefore believes, is a laudable and eminently coherent effort to prevent the sphere of the natural from being wholly reduced to the cultural. To all of which Callicott replies in "That Good Old-Time Wilderness Religion" that Rolston is simply reasserting the old Puritan dichotomous distinctions between "man" and nature and civilization and savagery in more acceptable secular terminology. The Callicott-Rolston-Callicott exchange opens Part III of this anthology.

In keeping with the dialectical organization of this anthology, Callicott's reply to Rolston is followed by two essays written in defense of the wilderness idea. The first is by Dave Foreman, one of the most daring contemporary captains of that army putatively commanded by Aldo Leopold, to which Rolston alludes, fighting the war for wilderness preservation declared by Robert Marshall. For a Euro-American environmental activist like Dave Foreman, what a ruminating academic philosopher such as Callicott dares to utter in polite discourse addressed to his peers, should it fail to be confined to the ivory tower, can have dire political consequences.

Foreman essays to refute Callicott's critique of the wilderness idea point for point, but his evident irritation, directed at Callicott personally, stems from his concern that the currently fashionable academic deconstruction of the wilderness *idea* can be abused by those implacable foes of wilderness *preservation* whose dissembling and unreasoned voices we began this introduction by excluding from the great new wilderness debate. The second is by leading Euro-American conservation biologist Reed Noss. The subtitle of Callicott's "The Wilderness Idea Revisited" is "The Sustainable Development Alternative." In "Sustainability and Wilderness," Noss resists what he perceives as a shift from what he believes to be the socially more demanding, but more effective, wilderness preservation paradigm to what he believes to be the socially more agreeable, but less effective, sustainable development paradigm in conservation policy. Noss identifies four values of designated and de facto wilderness areas (assuming that any such actually exist): their scientific value (by which he means a scientific "control" or "base datum of normality," against which the ecological performance of humanly inhabited and exploited areas can be measured); their biological value (by which he means habitat for species, especially the large predators, which do not coexist well with industrialized Homo sapiens); their value as a source of humility; and their intrinsic value.

One of the principal bones of contention between Callicott and Rolston is the extent and intensity of the environmental transformation of the Americas effected by Native Americans. This is an empirical question, which neither Callicott nor Rolston is qualified to answer with authority. Cultural geographer William Denevan is, however, eminently qualified to do so. In "The Pristine Myth: The Landscape of the Americas in 1492," originally published in "The Americas Before and After 1492: Current Geographical Research," a special issue of the *Annals of the Association of American Geographers,* observing the quincentennial of Columbus's first transatlantic voyage, Denevan reviews the evidence supporting his contention that the pre-Columbian New World was a humanized landscape almost everywhere. But to this argument, Denevan adds a novel twist. Old World diseases—which originated with the domestication of animals in Europe, Asia, and Africa—inversely decimated (to decimate literally means "to select by lot and kill one in ten," from the Latin *decimus,* tenth) Native American populations. With the exception of dogs, pre-Columbian Native Americans associated with no domesticated animals, and hence had evolved no resistances to those diseases, such as smallpox, which leapt from livestock to their human masters in the Old World. Only one Native American in ten, or, perhaps, one in twenty, survived the cycle of pathogen pandemics that swept through the Americas during the century after contact. Thus between 1492 and 1607, when the first permanent English settlement on the Atlantic coast was established, the Americas had been depopulated—the diseases, once arrived, having been communicated from Native to Native. Consequently, the landscape had begun to recover something of "its primeval character and influence" (in the words of the Wilderness Act). So, if Denevan's interpretation of the evidence is correct, the Puritans did find a wilderness condition, after all, in the New World, but it was—ironically, even oxymoronically—an artificial wilderness condition, a condition that was produced, albeit inadvertently and indirectly, by human agency.

"The Incarceration of Wildness: Wilderness Areas as Prisons," by Euro-American environmental philosopher Thomas Birch, was originally published in *Environmental Ethics* in 1990, the year after Guha's third-world critique and the year before the Callicott-Rolston-Callicott exchange in the *Environmental Professional.* Birch expresses discomfort with the wilderness idea in a North American context, its home turf. Adapting a style of analysis pioneered by French philosopher Michel Foucault, Birch articulates an image of the designated wilderness areas in the national forests and parks of the United States and Canada as being like prisons or mental institutions, places in which the nonhuman "Other"—the wild and untamable forms and forces of nature—can be isolated from the polite (from the Greek *polis,* city) "imperium," confined—and thus after a fashion, controlled and mastered. Birch nevertheless stops short of calling for a repeal of the Wilderness Act, though such a recommendation would seem to follow if one traces the practical implication of his argument to its logical conclusion.

William Cronon's widely read 1983 book, *Changes in the Land,* was instrumental in precipitating the great new wilderness debate. For in that book Cronon, a Euro-American environmental historian, detailed the manner in which the New England landscape had been humanly inhabited, exploited, and transformed by Native American peoples as a prelude to his description of how the English colonists differently inhabited, exploited, and transformed it. While Cronon's *Changes in the Land* is regu-

larly cited by the current critics of the concept of wilderness, the author himself was slow to directly criticize the wilderness idea. When he got around to doing so, he seemed unaware of the raging academic brouhaha for which *Changes in the Land* was partly responsible. "The Trouble with Wilderness" was originally published as the lead essay in a 1995 book, *Uncommon Ground,* edited by Cronon, that was one of several forthcoming from a series of seminars entitled Reinventing Nature, organized and sponsored by the University of California's Humanities Research Institute. This essay is a fitting climax to the general critique of the wilderness idea in Part III of this book because it is so sweeping. It begins by summarizing the intellectual history of the wilderness idea set forth in a more leisurely way by Roderick Nash in *Wilderness and the American Mind* thirty years ago (though Cronon cites Nash's classic only once and only in passing). From there it moves on to recapitulate, on behalf of Native Americans, the third- and fourth-world critique of the received wilderness idea offered by Guha (on behalf of rural Indians) and Gómez-Pompa and Kaus (on behalf of Central American peasants), and then to make the points here severally made by Talbot, Callicott, Birch, and others (all without citing these path-breaking authors, as if Cronon were articulating these thoughts for the first time). In short, Cronon's essay, though largely unoriginal, is a forcefully written summary and crystallization of the case against the received wilderness idea made piecemeal by the authors of the foregoing essays in Parts II and III of this anthology. With the publication of a condensed version of "The Trouble with Wilderness" in the *New York Times Sunday Magazine* on August 13, 1995, the great new wilderness debate finally burst out of the ivory tower and came to the attention of the general public. In keeping with the dialectical spirit of the debate format of this anthology and in scrupulous observance of the title of Part III, The Wilderness Idea Roundly Criticized *and* Defended, we close this section with a quiet but elegant defense of the received wilderness idea by Euro-American philosopher Marvin Henberg.

We (the editors) believe that the received wilderness idea has been mortally wounded by the withering critique to which it has been lately subjected. Even its most indignant and impassioned apologist, Dave Foreman, seems now to have capitulated, as a side-by-side comparison of his two contributions to this anthology will bear witness. The first, "Wilderness Areas for

Real"—his implacable response to Callicott's "The Wilderness Idea Revisited" in Part III—categorically defends the received wilderness idea and the classic nineteenth- and twentieth-century wilderness preservation movement associated with it. The second, "Wilderness: From Scenery to Nature" in Part IV, concedes that the historic wilderness preservation movement, though well intentioned, was, from the point of view of biological conservation, misguided. Nevertheless, however flawed, the wilderness idea has been indispensable to the twentieth-century nature conservation and environmental movements. Its reluctant critics cannot, in good conscience, just turn their attention to some other enticing intellectual puzzle and leave nature more vulnerable to exploitation than ever, since the wilderness idea has, by all accounts, been the most powerful antidote to such exploitation in the environmentalists' cognitive arsenal. As we enter the twenty-first century, we must carefully gather up and embrace the proverbial baby before we throw out the proverbial bath water.

We see two alternatives to the received wilderness idea currently taking shape. One alternative would deanthropocentrize the classic wilderness idea; the other would replace the received wilderness idea with the obviously related, but very different, concept of wildness and the concepts of free nature, sustainability, and reinhabitation that are allied with it.

As the seminal items in Part I amply indicate, wilderness was classically conceived to be a resource for human use—for nonconsumptive human use, to be sure, but for human use nevertheless: for human recreation, aesthetic gratification, spiritual communion, character building, scientific study, and so on. While John Muir and certainly Aldo Leopold, in writings other than those reprinted here, adumbrated a less anthropocentric point of view, it was not until the emergence of academic environmental philosophy in the 1970s that a fully and self-consciously nonanthropocentric environmental ethic was articulated, at least not in the conversation of the West. Thus, at last, we can dare to think about and argue for the preservation of areas of the Earth for the primary (if not sole) use and enjoyment of nonhuman beings. In terminology now standard in conservation biology, we can at last readily conceive of biodiversity reserves.

Wilderness areas, though originally set aside for purposes of virile recreation, scenery, and solitude, now have a new, nonanthropocentric raison d'être. They are habitat for intrinsically valuable rare and endangered species, especially such large carnivores as the brown bear and gray wolf—

which have been and continue to be persecuted by modern Homo sapiens. By this trope wilderness areas become not the playgrounds of wilderness recreationalists, the art galleries of natural esthetes, and the cathedrals of solitude seekers, but refugia for nonhuman forms of life. Conservation biology, the science of biological scarcity and diversity, should guide the selection, design, and management of these refugia.

The old system of wilderness areas in the United States and elsewhere represents only a point of departure, a cornerstone, for a new system of biodiversity reserves. As Dave Foreman here notes, under the present system, designated wilderness areas were not selected for preservation because they were either particularly rich in species or because they were the preferred habitat of threatened species. They were selected because they appeared to be untrammeled, had little foreseeable commercial value, and contained monumental scenery or opportunities for a primitive and unconfined type of recreation. Nor were their boundaries drawn with the habitat requirements of threatened species in mind.

Reconceiving wilderness areas as biodiversity reserves is a forward and proactive, not a backward and defensive step for the neo-Puritan cause of nature preservation. It provides a scientific mandate for expanding, not shrinking, existing wilderness set-asides and for connecting them with wild corridors. Moreover, it provides a scientific mandate for conferring biodiversity-reserve status on many other habitats—lowland forests, level grasslands, deserts, and wetlands, especially—that were despised by twentieth-century wilderness preservationists because they were not rugged enough to present a challenge to hikers and climbers or because they were not sufficiently grand and picturesque. But they too are biologically rich and diverse; and they too harbor endangered species.

The other alternative to the received wilderness idea is less obvious, less well-defined, and less easily identified. Arne Naess calls it "free nature"; Baird Callicott calls it "sustainability"; Euro-American nature poet and bioregionalist Gary Snyder calls it "reinhabitation." As Naess documents in his contribution to Part II of this anthology, Snyder frequently reminds us that the places we like to think of as humanly uninhabited before Europeans "discovered" them did indeed have their human denizens. Even the most forbidding places had names and were traversed by trails.

The biodiversity-reserve reconstruction of the thoroughly deconstructed received wilderness idea is essentially neo-Puritan because it segregates people from nature—not, however, on the basis of religious metaphysics (the image of God and original sin), philosophical metaphysics (rationality), or even their contemporary scientific successor (non-natural culture), but on the basis of necessity. If we are to preserve threatened species we have to provide them with habitat. That implies that we exclude incompatible human inhabitation and use (including, *nota bene,* recreational use)—which, as things now stand, is most human residence and use—from their habitat. So, reconceiving wilderness areas as biodiversity reserves effectively partitions the ecologically degraded human sphere from the remnant and recovering natural sphere. Substituting the concept of wildness for wilderness, we can envision (re)inhabiting nature symbiotically. In contrast, the basic free nature/sustainability/reinhabitation idea does not deanthropocentrize the classic preservation approach to conservation, but tries to maintain or reestablish, as the case may be, a human harmony with nature, a mutually beneficial relationship between Homo sapiens and the ecosystems human beings inhabit. The biodiversity reserve alternative perpetuates, indeed even exaggerates, the dualistic separation of people from nature implicit in the classic wilderness idea. The free nature/sustainability/reinhabitation alternative, to the contrary, rests on the premise that people are a part of nature. Some peoples still live sustainably and symbiotically with their nonhuman neighbors. But if Homo sapiens is a part of nature, all peoples can, in principle, either rediscover or reinvent a way of living sustainably and symbiotically with their nonhuman neighbors.

We begin Part IV with two short essays by Aldo Leopold, "Threatened Species" and "Wilderness." That would seem to be anachronistic. Leopold was an architect of the received wilderness idea and, to the very end of his life, he was a vocal partisan of classic wilderness preservation. But Leopold was, as is often said of him, a prophet, a person who thought far ahead of his time and foresaw the shape of things to come. In "Threatened Species," Leopold advocates setting aside habitat for those species threatened by human encroachment. And in "Wilderness," Leopold attends less to wilderness than to the potential for wildness in the middle landscape, as it is sometimes called, of North America—the rural landscape between densely settled urban areas and the largely unsettled designated and de facto wilderness areas.

In the next two items in Part IV, "Wilderness Recovery: Thinking Big in Restoration Ecology" and "Getting Back to the Right Nature: A Reply to Cronon's 'The Trouble with Wilderness,'" contemporary Euro-American conservation biologists Reed Noss and Donald Waller, respectively, advocate the establishment of extensive biodiversity reserves—but, somewhat confusingly, in the name of wilderness preservation. Indeed, Waller expressly argues that there is perfect continuity between the old wilderness idea and the new biodiversity reserve idea—despite the fact that, by his own account, the former serves primarily anthropocentric and the latter primarily nonanthropocentric values. For Waller, it seems, the operative distinction is not that between anthropocentric and nonanthropocentric values, but that between consumptive and nonconsumptive values (the latter including both the intrinsic value of biodiversity *and* its instrumental value as, say, a photo opportunity). Noss's essay originally appeared in the same issue of the *Environmental Professional* as Callicott's "The Wilderness Idea Revisited," a special issue on ecological restoration. Waller's essay is published here for the first time. In "Wilderness: From Scenery to Nature" and "Should Wilderness Areas Become Biodiversity Reserves?," Dave Foreman and J. Baird Callicott, respectively, detail the ways in which the new concept of biodiversity reserves differs from the received wilderness idea. Like Noss and Waller, Foreman regards the provision of habitat for threatened species as a new and potent rationale for the same old thing—"wilderness preservation"—in contemporary conservation policy, while Callicott believes that the biodiversity reserve concept and its rationale are sufficiently different, though evolved out of and continuous with the classic concept of wilderness, to warrant a different name. Whatever the name, the main idea is not to preserve, in the famous phrase of the Leopold Report, "vignettes of primitive America," in order to entertain, edify, or inspire human *visitors,* but to provide living space for species threatened by residential, commercial, and industrial development. In "Using Biodiversity as a Justification for Nature Protection in the US," R. Edward Grumbine traces the history of thought about the preservation of biodiversity back to the early twentieth century (though, of course, the term *biodiversity* itself has only recently been coined). Unfortunately, the voices of those visionaries whom Grumbine identifies—Joseph Grinnell and Victor Shelford are notable among them—who conceived of wilderness as biodiversity reserves were drowned out by those who mainly conceived of it as scenic areas principally dedicated to virile recreation.

The Puritan roots of the received wilderness idea are the source of some of its biggest present problems. Calvinist theology sharply divides humanity per se from nature. Hence wilderness areas were defined not in contrast to domesticated or civilized regions of the Earth, but in contrast to human inhabitation and human influence in general. Had wilderness been defined not in contrast to areas where "man and his own works dominate the landscape," and especially not in contrast to humanly inhabited areas—such that wilderness is, by definition, an area "where man himself is a visitor who does not remain"—but in contrast to cities and their pastoral-agrarian hinterlands, then there might be no great wilderness debate going on right now. At least several main problems with the received wilderness idea would have been obviated.

First, in 1492, as noted, the only continent measuring up to the definition of wilderness in the Wilderness Act was Antarctica. The Americas were humanly inhabited from the Bering Strait to the Strait of Magellan and from San Francisco Bay to Guanabara Bay; and they were, overall, radically transformed by their human inhabitants. Much of their most magnificent fauna—horses, camels, elephants, for example—was exterminated by the original discoverers of the New World, ten thousand or more years before Columbus stumbled on it. The European latecomers hardly found a "virgin" hemisphere. The pre-Columbian flora, moreover, was modified by anthropogenic fires; and those animal species populations—bison and deer, for example—not reduced to extinction by the immigrant Siberian big-game hunters and their immediate descendants were affected by the anthropogenic modification of the flora. If wilderness had been defined in contrast to civilization, not in contrast to human inhabitation and impact, then all of Australia and vast parts of the Americas—central Mexico, parts of the Andes, and the central Mississippi Valley are among the exceptions—would incontestably have been in a wilderness condition upon discovery by civilized Europeans. So there would be no plausibility to the claim that the alleged wilderness condition of the Americas and Australia is a "myth" made up by European colonists in order historically to "erase" indigenous peoples and assuage any residual guilt the colonizers might have felt about slaughtering the majority and dispossessing the rest.

Second, were wilderness areas defined in contrast to civilization, not in contrast to human inhabitation and impact, then, in establishing wilderness reserves in Africa and India, it would not have been necessary to forcibly remove the human residents living there—provided such residents were subsisting sustainably in what Arne Naess calls free nature by means of foraging, horticulture, or some combination of the two. The international socioeconomic problem—so forcefully stated by Guha and several other authors in Part II of this anthology—with the wilderness idea might have been obviated, in other words, had a wilderness condition, all along, been understood to mean the absence of cities, surplus agriculture, and domesticated livestock, not the absence of people per se and their sustainable subsistence economies.

Third, the more abstract, philosophical problem with the received wilderness idea—that it perpetuates the pre-Darwinian metaphysical separation of man from nature—would, of course, have been obviated were wilderness defined in contrast to civilization, not in contrast to human inhabitation and use.

"In Wildness Is the Preservation of the World," Jack Turner, a Euro-American who holds a Ph.D. in philosophy and works as a backcountry guide, begins, in the context of this anthology, to develop the free nature/sustainability/reinhabitation alternative. Turner points out that Thoreau's famous dictum is often misquoted as "In wild*er*ness is the preservation of the world." Echoing Birch, Turner claims that formally designating areas as wilderness often, ironically, tames the wildness in them. To reclaim the wildness in wilderness and in ourselves, we must, Turner believes, live and work in the wild world. How to do so without destroying that wildness, is, however, a big problem; and though he broaches it, Turner does not directly essay to solve it. One approach to solving that problem is to ask how those indigenous peoples who live(d) and work(ed) in the wild world, without destroying its wildness, manage(d) to do so. In "Cultural Parallax in Viewing North American Habitats," Euro-American ethnobotanist Gary Nabhan explores the way his neighbors in southern Arizona, the O'odham (formerly called Papago), managed to do so. For contemporary Euro-Americans or Anglo-Australians to go native, as it were, is, of course, impossible; it is even difficult, as Nabhan points out, for contemporary Native peoples to sustain their own adaptive cultures. But from study of the way longtime residents in a place have symbiotically adapted to it, the general principles of reinhabitation may be learned and applied in fresh and creative ways. That is just what Gary Snyder's essay, "The Rediscovery of Turtle Island," is all about. Snyder provides examples, from his own extensive experience, of how to go about gently reinhabiting free nature in a manner mindful of how the earlier inhabitants did so, but in a manner that is thoroughly autochthonous.

This anthology ends with a comprehensive philosophical reflection on the great new wilderness debate by Anglo-Australian ecofeminist Val Plumwood. In "Wilderness Skepticism and Wilderness Dualism," published here for the first time, Plumwood exposes the androcentrism of the received wilderness idea as well as its ethnocentrism. The received wilderness idea—of wilderness as virgin, unsullied territory—expresses, she suggests, an essentially male point of view, as well as an essentially colonial point of view. After detailing the slight differences in the postcolonial Anglo-Australian and Euro-American wilderness movements, Plumwood takes up the deeper conundrum presented by the concept of wilderness, identifying three views about the culture-nature relationship, all of which she believes to be faulty. First, in Holmes Rolston's view, the acquisition of culture divorced Homo sapiens from nature. Human culture is biologically revolutionary, as Rolston sees it, providing Homo sapiens with a means of adaptation many orders of magnitude more rapid than adaptation through genetic mutation and natural selection, to which all other species are limited. Rolston is a modern classic dualist on the nature-culture question; human beings transcend nature. Second, in Baird Callicott's view, human culture is not unique; many other species transmit cultural information as well as genetic information from generation to generation. The difference between Homo sapiens and other species is, in this regard, a matter of degree, not of kind. In Plumwood's opinion, Callicott reduces culture to nature. Third, William Cronon seems to adopt the poststructuralist view that "nature" is a cultural construct, varying across history, gender, and society. In Plumwood's opinion, his reduction runs in a direction opposite to Callicott's: Cronon reduces nature to culture.

Plumwood's resolution of this triangular nature-culture affair is subtle, but it seems that she is saying that the classic modern dualistic view of the nature-culture relationship, so forthrightly represented by Rolston, is not correct, but neither are Callicott's reduction of culture to nature nor Cronon's reduction of nature to culture good ways to solve the problem. Both

terms of the old nature-culture dichotomy need to be maintained, but not opposed. If one were to try to put their point graphically and succinctly, one might say that nature and culture can be united as the yin and yang. They are opposites, yet not opposed. They are two, yet together form one whole, neither complete without the other. Nature and culture—like male and female or self and other—are, in a word, complementary.

Plumwood thus provides analytic depth to Callicott's sketch, in "Should Wilderness Areas Become Biodiversity Reserves?," of a complementary twenty-first-century philosophy of conservation that transcends the dichotomous twentieth-century philosophies of conservation classically articulated by Gifford Pinchot and John Muir—wise use of natural resources versus wilderness preservation. We have long known that utilitarian resource management, as envisioned by Gifford Pinchot and his successors, is flawed—because it ignores the relationship of resources to nonresources; that is, because it is ecologically uninformed. We have just found out that wilderness preservation, as envisioned by Muir and his successors, is equally flawed—for all the reasons elaborated in this volume. Conservation philosophy is presently, therefore, in a state of doubt and confusion. But out of such states can arise something new and more refined. And what might that be? We (the editors) envision, first, the creation of a global system of scientifically selected, designed, managed, and interconnected biodiversity reserves; complemented, second, by support for those traditional peoples who are doing so to continue living symbiotically with their nonhuman neighbors in free nature, and also support for people like Turner and Snyder who are attempting to harmoniously reinhabit free nature; and, third and finally, a commitment on the part of everyone else to the development of ecologically sustainable economies. This represents, of course, a utopian prospect—an ideal. Utopian thinking has been a mainstay of Western philosophy from Plato on. In the context of human ethics, Aristotle, Plato's successor in the Western tradition, observed that we are more likely to go right if we have a target at which to aim. The same seems true to us in our effort to get beyond the received wilderness idea.